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Abstract 
 
The turn of the twenty-first century saw the re-emergence of debates about the 
reconfiguration of European financial geographies and the role of stock 
exchange mergers in this process. There has been, however, no systematic 
attempt to date to analyse such changes. This paper proposes a specific 
conceptual framework to explore these issues. It uses a product-based analysis 
to examine, in the context of recent stock exchange mergers, the factors 
affecting the competitiveness of a financial centre. It argues that it is important 
to understand three intertwined influences – product complementarities, the 
nature of local epistemic communities, and regulation – and their contingent 
effects on change. This is exemplified by a tentative application of the 
framework to the case of Amsterdam in order to better understand its recent 
decline in competitiveness as a European financial centre. 
 1
Introduction 
 
The turn of the twenty-first century saw the re-emergence of public and 
academic debates about the centrality of London as Europe’s preeminent 
international financial centre (IFC) and the wider reconfiguration of European 
financial geographies (Bindemann 1999; Harrschar-Ehrnborg 2002; Seifert et al. 
2000). This was sparked by the EU agenda to develop a Europe-wide financial 
market, the introduction of the Euro currency, and the first attempts to create a 
Pan-European exchange. With the highly visible, but failed, initial merger talks 
between the Frankfurt-based Deutsche Börse and the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) in the late 1990s (Beaverstock et al. 2001; Faulconbridge 2004), and the 
creation of Euronext (the first cross-border exchange in Europe with 
subsidiaries in Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris in 2000), the scene was set for 
consolidation in Europe’s fragmented and diversified exchange landscape 
(FESE 2006; McCreevy 2005). Renewed bids for the LSE by both its German 
competitor and by Euronext in 2005 (Bundeskartellamt 2005; Competition 
Commission 2005), as well as the recent entrance by the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq in the European scrimmage, point to a future of 
intercontinental alliances and even transcontinental exchanges. 
While media speculation about the local impact of cross-border stock 
exchange mergers flares up periodically, the empirical evidence on the 
interrelationship between the restructuring of exchanges and its impact on the 
wider urban setting in which these exchanges are located is both scarce and 
indeterminate. Historically stock exchanges have been closely connected to the 
development of national and even international financial centres (Michie 1999; 
Thrift 1994), but these linkages seem to have become weaker with the 
increased virtualisation of stock exchanges in recent years (Lo and Grote 2003). 
However, there is much that remains to be done in current research into these 
linkages, both conceptually and empirically. In this context, the paper explores 
the implications of the continually fluxing stock exchange landscape for financial 
centre development by focusing on the changing levels of trade in different 
financial products in Amsterdam pre and post merger with the Brussels and 
Paris (and latterly Lisbon) exchanges in the guise of the Euronext consortium. 
As such, the paper’s aim is primarily explorative. It seeks to assess the 
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explanatory power of a product and knowledge-based approach to the financial 
landscape by using Amsterdam as a test case. 
The paper is divided into three parts. First, the discussion focuses upon 
the spatial stickiness of international finance and identifies the forces that 
continue to exert considerable influence on the geographical organisation of the 
European financial landscape. It is suggested that it is the type of financial 
product developed and traded in each centre that matters most in the spatial 
(re)configuration of Europe’s financial centres. More specifically, the paper 
argues that the nature of the mix of complementary financial products 
determines the strength of a financial centre and that this in turn is influenced by 
the activities of local epistemic communities; national regulation; and, 
embedded within this context, stock exchange reconfiguration. Second, drawing 
upon the case of Amsterdam, the paper considers the extent to which the 
analytical framework proposed allows us to make sense of the city’s recent 
decline as a European financial centre. The relationship between different 
financial products is examined and the effect of the emergence of the Euronext 
consortium is explored with some preliminary data on the Amsterdam financial 
centre. The paper concludes with a tentative discussion of the relation between 
stock exchange reorganisation and the informational content of products traded 
in a specific financial centre. 
 
 
The Spatial Stickiness of International Finance 
 
The organisational structure of the European financial system, and in particular 
the constitution of the stock exchange and financial market landscape, has 
been explored from various perspectives. For example, Michie (1992, 1999) 
acknowledges the pivotal role of the Lloyds Insurance market, and especially its 
magnetic qualities for those seeking mercantile insurance, in the development 
of London as an international financial centre during the British Empire. 
Similarly, Thrift (1994) and Porteous (1999) have emphasised the importance of 
regulation and administrative procedures in order to explain the physical co-
location of financial firms that specialise in equity-related activities. More 
recently, attention has turned to the effects of the virtualisation of stock 
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exchanges on existing financial geographies. Drawing on the well rehearsed 
“death of distance” (Cairncross 1997) and “end of geography” (O’Brien 1992) 
theses, the evolution of stock exchanges away from “open outcry” pits towards 
“screen-based” trading has been examined. This has lead to claims that the 
traditional anchoring devices that fix activities in IFCs have been weakened and 
that as a result, financial centres might gradually disappear in the vortex of 
dispersal that is technologically driven globalisation (Engelen 2007). At the 
same time, fascinating stories have been told about the changes in the “social 
construction” of markets, as physically embodied encounters between traders in 
the pit are replaced by hoards of (still predominantly) men staring intently at 
screens. Of course, even in a virtualised world markets are being “produced” 
and “reproduced” by the performative effects of practices, ideas, and techniques 
of traders embedded in social networks (Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005; 
MacKenzie and Millo 2003; Zaloom 2003) but it seems this might increasingly 
have less spatial fixity than before with financial knowledges moving across new 
spatial topologies (Allen 2002; Amin and Cohendet 2004). 
All of these bodies of literature touch upon issues that are important for 
understanding changing financial geographies. However, they fail to add up to a 
consistent analytical framework that allows us to identify the full gamut of 
relevant variables. While regulation clearly matters for the distribution of 
financial activities over space, it is evident that the regulatory landscape has 
radically changed since the early 1990s. Responding to the intensifying 
transnationalisation of financial activities, regulation at the national level has 
increasingly been liberalised while a growing number of responsibilities and 
prerogatives have been shifted to transnational agents like the EU, the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), and other, even more obscure agents (Braithwaite and 
Drahos 2000; Lütz 2002). As such, national-level regulation has become less a 
constraint and more a source of competitive (dis)advantage. 
The “end of geography” literature, on the other hand, while forcefully 
arguing for an increased awareness of the impact of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) on international finance, clearly seems to 
overstate its main insights in what is often unmitigated technological 
determinism. The continuing relevance of place and co-location, demonstrated 
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by, for example, the recent successes of New York’s South Manhattan and, 
especially, the City of London (see The Economist 2006), doubtless flies in the 
face of all radical globalisation claims. Technological possibilities of 
virtualisation are clearly counteracted by more traditional advantages of co-
location. It remains to be seen, however, whether these advantages are indeed 
of the traditional kind or have changed their nature under the impact of 
regulatory and technological change. 
The very productive “social studies of finance” perspective, finally, 
presents a growing amount of evidence that even virtual financial markets have 
a social underpinning, which, moreover, can only be fruitfully investigated by 
ethnographic means. As such, this literature both emphasises the importance of 
going beyond the proximity clichés that have for so long been the stock-in-trade 
of economic geographers and of the need for economic geographers to become 
more like cultural anthropologists (see also Clark 2005a). However, because of 
its descendance from social studies of science, this literature has a tendency 
towards meta-theorising as a result of which scholars can lose sight of the 
ultimate explanatory role of the social sciences. 
While taking on board, as much as possible, the insights of these three 
bodies of literature, we take as our starting point a corpus of literature that is 
more down-to-earth in the sense that it takes empirical developments as an 
invitation for conceptual and theoretical renewal rather than the other way 
round. 
 
 
Geographies of Virtual and Amalgamated Stock Exchanges 
 
The virtualisation of stock exchanges was one of the underlying drivers behind 
the “death of distance” and “end of geography” exaggerations, principally 
because of the technical ability it provided to trade from a location physically 
remote from the site of an exchange. However, as Martin (1999) observed, this 
“may well have annihilated space… but it has by no means undermined the 
significance of location, of place… New technologies and globalisation are not 
obliterating the landscapes of money, but reconfiguring them in significant 
ways” (15-16, emphasis in original). The most important outcome of such 
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reconfigurations was the emergence of what has become known as a “new” 
international financial system, a system where money and financial products 
flow more freely (but not totally unimpeded) across capitalist networks (Clark 
and Wójzcik 2006; Thrift and Leyshon 1988). Nevertheless, IFCs have 
continued to act as “nodes” within a “neo-marshallian” system (Amin and Thrift 
1992), exerting a form of “stickiness” that, to follow Clark’s (2005b) analogy, 
means that “money flows like mercury”, rather than water, with geographically 
uneven pools of financial activity remaining. This, then, is the most well-
rehearsed argument about the continued importance of place to financial 
activities, with three strands of discussion, emphasizing different explanatory 
variables, continuing to dominate explanations of the importance of “being 
there.” 
 
• The “urbanization” logic. Pivotal to the international financial system are the 
large global financial institutions that act as the principal traders and prime 
brokers for third parties. For example, the UK’s Competition Commission 
(2005) noted that the ten largest financial institutions are responsible for half 
of all European equity trading. The same is true for global foreign exchange 
trade. While uniquely transparent and globalised, trade is highly dominated 
by the largest investment banks and is deeply embedded in the 
organisational entrails of these firms, allowing for highly valuable trade 
between anonymous “others” who share the birthmarks of the organisations 
of which they are part (Clark and Thrift 2005). These firms also have intense 
relationships with a range of other advanced producer services (in particular 
accountants, lawyers, and financial information providers) that act as 
essential intermediaries in financial transactions. Consequently, leading 
IFCs such as London and New York, where these financial conglomerates 
have their (head) offices – primarily for historical reasons – continue to 
remain hubs of financial activities because of their agglomerations of 
financial institutions and supporting producer services and the benefits 
brought to them in terms of both the timeliness of services and ability to 
convey tacit advice and consolidate important inter-firm relationships 
(Beaverstock, Smith, and Taylor 2000; Faulconbridge 2007; Sassen 2000; 
Thrift 1987). However, while urban concentration was crucial for financial 
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liquidity before virtualisation, the advantages of concentration seem to have 
shifted in today’s screen-based environment. Instead, the presence of a 
sufficient number of knowledgeable clients and suppliers with which to 
conduct ever more complex and sophisticated bespoke trades seems 
important today, something which leads us to our second point. 
 
• Localisation advantages. Finance has always been an industry where the 
knowledge of traders has had a direct influence on profitability, something 
that is even further amplified by the increased complexity of contemporary 
financial products (Thrift 1994; Tickell 2000). The clustering of financial 
institutions within IFCs leads to what has been described as “information 
spillovers” (Porteous 1999) or “buzz” (Storper and Venables 2004). This is 
the process of knowledge creation and dispersion that is facilitated by the 
relatively tight spatial matrix within which financial institutions locate 
themselves in leading IFCs (e.g., The City and Canary Wharf in London, 
South Manhattan in New York, “das Bankenviertel” in Frankfurt), and the 
dense social interactions between traders within these matrices (Corporation 
of London 2003; Thrift 1994). Being embedded within such spaces of 
knowledge production and dispersion appears to be essential for conducting 
profitable trades. As studies in the sociology of finance have shown 
(Abolafia 2004; Beunza and Stark 2004; Zaloom 2003), decision-making and 
actions in financial markets cannot be disassociated from the interactions 
within the trading room, and more widely within the local financial 
community. However, it is increasingly debated whether that actually 
requires physical proximity and whether other forms of proximity — social, 
cultural, organisational — do not suffice (Allen 2002; Amin and Cohendet 
2004; Beaverstock 2007; Faulconbridge 2006; Grote, Lo, and Harrschar-
Ehrnborg 2002). The implications of this, while contested (Clark, Wójcik, and 
Bauer 2006; Gertler 2003), are potentially significant and may force a 
reconceptualisation of the nature of localisation advantages. 
 
• Institutional and regulatory advantage. While some have suggested this is of 
declining influence (e.g., Budd 1999), it is argued here that the regulatory 
institutions influencing IFCs are as pertinent as ever (see also Clark 2002; 
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Corporation of London 2003). Without wanting to become entangled in 
debates about the rolling back or otherwise of the nation-state, it seems that 
regulatory influences continue to provide advantages to some centres and 
disadvantages to others. The example of the Bund-future market, primarily 
based on German federal bonds, but initially traded and regulated in London 
because of the prevention of derivatives trading in Germany until 1990, 
illustrates such an argument (Laulajainen 2001). After re-regulation the 
Bund-future market moved to Frankfurt because of the advantages of the 
German electronic trading system, especially its cost-efficiency. However, 
this resulted in an interesting form of spatial organisation and specialisation. 
The exchange was based and regulated in Germany, but traders continued 
to be almost exclusively located in London as the “epistemic knowledge 
community” exists there and the “localization” advantages described above 
“fix” traders in the City (Lo and Grote 2003). Other examples are the 
successes of Dublin and Luxembourg to attract an increasing number of 
hedge funds and other money managers by lax establishment rules and 
competitive fiscal systems (Hardie and MacKenzie 2006). Even more topical 
are the worries voiced by the British financial establishment about a future 
merger of the LSE with Nasdaq, currently one of its largest shareholders, 
over the possibility that the LSE would come to fall under the over restrictive 
regulation of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
(Financial Times 2006a). Similarly, the growing share of international initial 
public offerings (IPO’s) going to London’s LSE and alternative investment 
market (AIM) instead of New York’s NYSE is largely the effect of prohibitive 
corporate governance regulation under the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 
(The Economist 2006). Hence, it is fair to conclude that even in a neoliberal 
world, regulatory differences can still play a role in explaining the differential 
distribution of financial activities over space. 
 
The “end of geography”, then, is far from nigh in the European financial system. 
The introduction of ICT and the virtualisation of trade are not going to wipe the 
historically pre-structured slate of finance clean. Hence, technological 
extrapolations are unable to explain the present nor do they allow an easy 
reading off of the future pattern of the geographically uneven “pools” of financial 
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activity from current distributions of capital. Similarly, the location and 
organisational form of stock exchanges are not proxies for market location and 
IFC construction (Clark 2005b). Consequently, it is increasingly important to 
ground analyses of European (and global) financial geographies in a closer 
understanding of the wider contexts that create sticky and, at the same time, 
shifting geographies. To do this, we need a conceptualisation of finance that is 
not preloaded towards one of the three explanatory variables mentioned above 
but is catholic enough to encompass all three of them. We surmise that a focus 
on financial products, and the associated market conditions and knowledge 
communities that facilitate their development and trading, as suggested by 
Clark and O’Connor (1997), is up to this task.  
Since financial products are about prices, risks and (future) streams of 
income as well as the external conditions impinging on these variables, they are 
pre-eminently about information. As such, a focus on products and the 
information they contain clearly covers the epistemic community dimension of 
the explanatory template. Moreover, since knowledge and information differ with 
regard to the extent in which they are in need of interpretation, a focus on the 
informational content of different financial products allows us to determine the 
importance of physical proximity to both clients and suppliers with regard to 
different financial transactions and hence, to explain their spatial distribution.  
The institutional dimension impinges on this in at least two ways. First, in 
determining the size of the domestic financial industry and the depth of public 
financial markets. Since the liquidity of financial markets is institutionally 
determined, the quality and quantity of available financial products is too. If 
there is a large amount of domestic capital available for investment in equity 
and bond markets, as is generally the case in political economies with funded 
pension systems, financial markets tend to be deeper and hence more 
transparent than is the case in political economies with pay-as-you-go pension 
systems (Clark 2003; Verdier 2002). Second, in affecting the extent to which 
financial regulation, corporate governance law, and securities law do conform to 
what is increasingly seen as the international standard, namely British or 
American regulatory conventions. This latter, more direct dimension of 
institutional determination covers everything from the entrance criteria of public 
stock markets, to the accountancy rules concerning the consolidation of pension 
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assets and liabilities (Véron, Autret, and Galichon 2006), and the legal 
protections provided to minority shareholders (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999). This influences the locational decision-
making of leading traders and investors. As such, a product perspective allows 
us to track shifts over time in the composition of the type of trade conducted in 
specific IFCs and relate these to stock exchange reconfigurations and changes 
in the underlying variables just mentioned. 
Note, however, that while clearly implicating path dependent 
explanations of the current distribution of finance over space, our 
conceptualisation of institutional “effects” is more about the managed 
“reproduction” (or, as is the case in Amsterdam: the failure to do so) of financial 
advantages and disadvantages than about the “origins” of these advantages 
and disadvantages. Both are related, but different, and the two parts need to be 
kept distinct in order to avoid the fallacy of functionalism (explaining the genesis 
of a particular arrangement from its current function) or the a-historical terra 
nullius-assumption of much of neoclassical economics (see Mahoney 2000). 
We emphatically do not want to suggest that the empirical field of finance is not 
historically prestructured. Hence, the distribution of transparent products will not 
be random, as the “end of geography” thesis maintains, but will tend to “flow” to 
historically determined pools of capital and, in particular, those IFCs that 
reproduce themselves in an attractive manner in the contemporary era. The 
paper does not pretend to provide an historical explanation of the genesis of 
specific geographical pools of finance but takes the historically determined 
distribution of capital over space as an empirical given.1 This historical 
substrate is, then, used as a starting point for considering contemporary trends 
and informs analysis of the present-day influences on the geographical 
dynamics of finance. Before visiting the case of Amsterdam in order to 
exemplify this argument, we first briefly summarise Clark and O’Connor’s 
framework and its usefulness in guiding this type of analysis. 
                                            
1 See Wallerstein (1974), Braudel (1982), Harvey (1982), Arrighi (1994), and Cassis 
(2006) for historical accounts of the genesis of the unequal spatial distribution of capital 
over time.  
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Geographies of “Sticky” Financial Products 
 
According to Clark and O’Connor (1997), the localisation of trading in 
transparent financial products is primarily determined by price considerations 
and hence by “economies of scale.” Knowledge of the underlying entity (firm, 
commodity, real estate, infrastructure, etc.) is unimportant, as the controlling 
variables determining the price of property rights are highly standardised, 
instantly available and hardly in need of insider interpretations. Consequently, 
trade in these types of products, which consists mostly of simple buy/sell 
transactions, can take place anywhere, with concentration normally occurring in 
centres such as London and New York because of the critical mass of traders 
present (and therefore the reduction in costs and a high level of liquidity 
offered). Trade in commodities, foreign exchange (FX) trade as well as in “blue 
chip” stocks of large internationally renowned firms and guilt-edged bonds are 
obvious examples of financial products that form the backbone of international 
financial trade, and as such have increasingly become global assets that do no 
longer provide co-located traders with proximity advantages. Since these types 
of assets have increasingly become global assets, the information on which 
their prices are dependent does no longer serve as a criterion to distinguish 
insiders and outsiders.  
The intermediate category consists of translucent products. These are 
variations on well known global products that use local mutations to create a 
geographically and temporarily unique product. As a result, the knowledge 
needed to trade in such products and the risk associated with them is unclear to 
those outside the market, yet is not exclusively local in a strict sense. A small 
investment to gain insight into the product may allow it to be traded without 
physical presence in the long term. Clark and O’Connor (1997: 97) 
acknowledge that the translucent category often blurs with the transparent and 
opaque ones. As such, this intermediate category bridges the completely 
transparent and the completely opaque. While hard to identify and delineate 
clearly, it is our contention that within the contemporary financial landscape, 
those financial agents who are able to render transparent products (partially) 
opaque (e.g., hedge funds) and opaque products partially transparent (e.g., 
private equity funds) have become increasingly important for large institutional 
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investors looking for (quasi) bespoke products that fit their highly idiosyncratic 
risk and return profiles, and have come to determine by and by the dynamism 
on which vital IFCs rely. Hence, if nothing else, localisation advantages and 
regulation can ensure that such competitive advantage is gained. 
Trade in opaque financial products, by definition, takes place in close 
proximity to the actors who have a thorough knowledge of the underlying entity. 
There is a deep information asymmetry in the sense that traders have no way of 
fully understanding the variables controlling fluctuations in a product’s price, 
something that can only be overcome by developing strong relationships both 
with those who “design” the product and those with experience of its trading. 
Private equity exemplifies this category, but so do the small and mid cap 
sections of public exchanges. Since changes in the underlying variables 
impinging on the price of the property titles largely occur outside the radar 
screens of the international analysts, different means of access to crucial 
information are needed in order to be a successful trader. Here proximity and 
access to relevant epistemic communities becomes crucial. Outsiders lacking 
these avenues of access are dependent on local “gatekeepers” in order to be 
able to trade in these opaque financial categories. At the same time, regulation 
determines whether such innovative products can be accommodated. 
As Table 1 highlights, one result of the differing informational content of 
each product type is, according to Clark and O’Connor’s (1997) analytical 
framework, a product-specific spatial distribution of financial activities over 
different IFCs, which neither conforms to the strong “end of geography” claim 
nor to the “neo-marshallian” world of Amin and Thrift (1992), in which 
agglomeration spillovers are strong enough to withstand the combined 
centripetal forces of market integration and technological change. Instead, the 
Clark and O’Connor framework leads one to expect increasing concentration of 
transparent trade in the largest, most well-equipped IFCs, while the trade in 
opaque products would remain located across a wider range of IFCs, including 
smaller centres such as Amsterdam. Less clear are the spatial expectations for 
the intermediate category of “translucent” products since Clark and O’Connor 
have largely treated them as a residual category. Below we apply the Clark and 
O’Connor framework to trace the fate of the Amsterdam IFC from the 1980s 
onward in order to identify the as yet undertheorised interlinkages between the 
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three product categories and the three-pronged influence of agglomeration, 
localisation, and regulation on processes of change over time. We argue that 
the changing geography of financial products is a result of interrelationships 
between all three product categories and that, in particular, transparent and 
opaque products are interlinked with their geographies being mutually 
dependent and not exclusive. 
 
 
Changing Financial Geographies: The Case of Amsterdam 
 
Sustainable Growth? 
 
As a historical financial centre that once ruled the international financial world, 
Amsterdam has succeeded in weathering many fateful shifts and turns (see 
Barbour 1976; Braudel 1982; Cassis 2006; Neal 1990; Riley 1980; Schama 
1987). During the 1980s, the Amsterdam financial community was well 
positioned to jump the bandwagon of the financial boom that started with the 
demise of “embedded liberalism” in the mid-1970s (Helleiner 1994; Ruggie 
1982). Compared to the 1960s and 1970s when annual turnover of trade in 
equities and bonds at the Amsterdam stock exchange ranged form EUR 4.5 
billion to EUR 8.7 billion and EUR 1.2 billion to EUR 9.7 billion, respectively, for 
shares and bonds, during the 1980s levels of EUR 83 billion were reached for 
shares and EUR 90 billion for bonds (CBS 2006a). Given this sharp increase in 
liquidity and hence volatility of the most transparent products traded in the 
Amsterdam IFC, it became increasingly attractive to set up a formal trading floor 
for the trade in derivatives which until then had largely been traded “over the 
counter”. The Amsterdam Option Exchange, established in 1978, is a clear 
example of the adroitness of the Amsterdam economic elite in anticipating a 
number of organisational and technological innovations that were destined to 
radically change the face of international finance by building upon an already 
existing epistemic community of commodity traders in order to create a new 
equity option market. The Option Exchange was the first of its kind in Europe 
and attracted a large number of foreign financial firms during the 1980s and 
1990s to the Amsterdam IFC. At that time equity options were still relatively 
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obscure and hence possessed opaque informational characteristics, forcing 
foreign firms to locate in the immediate surroundings of the option exchange at 
the Rokin in the centre of Amsterdam. While the uniqueness and hence 
attractiveness of the Amsterdam IFC gradually wore off as the number of formal 
derivative exchanges increased and options gradually lost their “opaqueness,” 
the early establishment of such a formal derivative exchange and the facilitation 
of this by suitable regulation, clearly indicates Amsterdam’s role in the 
development and trade of the new breed of “opaque” financial products that 
symbolised the “new” international financial system (Tickell 2000).  
Another innovation that saw Amsterdam at the forefront was the use of 
ICT to virtualise the trading process, enhancing the accessibility of the 
Amsterdam exchanges by means of remote access ports. The Amsterdam 
stock exchange, which went virtual in 1994, was one of the first worldwide to do 
so, as was the Amsterdam Options Exchange which followed in 2002. These 
decisions must be seen in the light of increasing competition from more liquid 
financial markets such as the ones domiciled in Paris, Frankfurt and, especially, 
London, with the underlying rationale that virtualisation would bring higher 
trading efficiency, improve liquidity, and would thus enhance the attractiveness 
of the Amsterdam trading platform both for investors and for share issuing firms. 
Concerning the former, the two Amsterdam exchanges witnessed a rapidly 
increasing growth in turnover during the 1990s. Turnover at the Amsterdam 
option exchange rose from a little over ten million contracts traded per day in 
1990 to well over sixty million contracts in 1999. The biggest boost to trading 
volume, however, came after the virtualisation of the exchange when the 
number of contracts traded daily rapidly reached the one billion mark 
(Euronext.liffe 2005). Turnover at the Amsterdam stock exchange too got a 
huge boost from virtualisation. While the beginning of the 1990s saw average 
daily turnover reaching a level of EUR 66 billion, in 1994 it had increased to 
EUR 143 billion, before reaching an all time high of EUR 707 billion in 1997 
(CBS 2006b). Also in terms of share issues, the 1990s saw a huge increase. 
Starting from a low of EUR 326 million in 1988, it reached EUR 2.7 billion in 
1994, and since has gradually increased to EUR 18.9 billion in 1999 (DNB 
2006), clearly demonstrating the liquidity-attracting effects of virtualisation. 
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A third, organisational innovation within the world of stock exchanges 
was undertaken in 1996 when the Paris Bourse and the Brussels and 
Amsterdam exchanges announced that they would integrate their (virtual) order 
books and would adopt the Parisian trading system in order to pool their 
respective liquidities, which were considered to be too small to withstand the 
increasing centrifugal force of the LSE. Euronext, as the product of the merger 
was christened, is at the moment of writing still the only truly transnational stock 
exchange. While the value of average daily trading of the combined exchanges 
of Euronext in 1990 added up to only $ 170 billion, turning them into the eighth 
largest exchange worldwide, currently Euronext is the fifth largest exchange in 
terms of average daily turnover (after, respectively, the NYSE, Nasdaq, the 
LSE, and the Tokyo exchanges), the sixth largest exchange in terms of market 
capitalisation (after, respectively, the NYSE, Tokyo, Nasdaq, the LSE, and the 
Osaka exchanges), and the eighth largest in terms of number of listed firms 
(after, respectively, the Bombay, Toronto, Nasdaq, LSE, NYSE, Tokyo, and 
Korean exchanges) (WFE 2006). This, again, clearly demonstrates the 
importance of pooled liquidity for the operational success of an exchange 
organisation in a context of financial market integration. 
During the 1990s, the anticipatory strategy of the Amsterdam financial 
community (since 1992 officially represented by the Amsterdam Financial 
Centre Foundation) appeared to pay off in terms of number of firms, share of 
financial services in Amsterdam GDP, and in total turnover. The number of 
foreign banks in the Netherlands rose from fifty-four in 1990 to seventy-nine in 
1997, more than three quarters of which were located in the Amsterdam city 
centre (NIBE-SVV, several years). A similar picture is shown in the field of stock 
and option trading. While the total number of officially registered Dutch stock 
traders declined gradually from nineteen in 1990 to twelve in 2000, this was 
more than offset by the rise of foreign traders, whose number rose from eight in 
1993 to twenty-seven in 2002 (DNB 2002). This growth was reflected in the 
increasing share of the financial services in Amsterdam GDP. While the 
Amsterdam economy increased between 1996 and 2002 by 25.7 percent, 
financial services grew by a stunning 46 percent, the largest single annual 
share of which was booked in 1999 (22.6 percent). Overall, total annual 
turnover of Amsterdam’s financial service industry increased by a factor of 
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sixteen between the early 1970s and the turn of the twenty-first century, most of 
which occurred during the 1990s. Meanwhile Amsterdam’s economy overall 
merely grew by a factor of five. At the turn of the millennium financial services 
generated approximately one-fourth of the total economic product of 
Amsterdam compared with only one-fifth in the early 1970s (CBS 2006c).  
Less clear-cut were the developments in terms of employment. Since 
Amsterdam is also the controlling centre of Dutch financial retail activities, 
domiciling two of the three large Dutch retail banks (ING and ABN Amro), the 
employment gains caused by growth in wholesale activities were largely offset 
by huge labour reductions in retail banking because of the introduction of ICT 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the disappearance of many retail offices as a 
result of market consolidation,2 and the rapidly increasing replacement of full 
scale retail bank facilities by ATM’s,3 all of which have had a downward effect 
on employment (G10 2003). Nevertheless, during the 1990s the employment in 
the Amsterdam financial industry increased with more than 15,000 jobs 
between 1993 and 2001, which represents an increase of well over 30 percent. 
Or to put it otherwise, in 2001 one in every eight workers in Amsterdam was 
directly employed in the financial services against one in ten in the early 1990s. 
 
 
Post-millennial Blues? 
 
So far, the Clark and O’Connor tale seems to hold true. Despite virtualisation, 
consolidation, and continuing globalisation, Amsterdam’s financial centre 
seemed to be able to withstand the growth of London and other financial 
centers (e.g., Frankfurt), assumingly because of its opaque and translucent 
markets. However, after the turn of the millennium things began to change. 
Banks and security traders shed workers, losing, on average, one-fifth of 
employees between 2001 and 2003. According to the Dutch Society of Equity 
Analysts, the total number of analysts has decreased by several hundred since 
2001 (Het Financieele Dagblad 2003). Combined with the employment effects 
                                            
2 Because of bank mergers, between 1997 and 2004 the number of bank offices in The 
Netherlands declined from 7,161 to 4,100 (CBS 2006d). 
3 Between 1997 and 2004 the number of ATMs in The Netherlands increased from 
6,397 to 7,889 (CBS 2006e). 
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of continuing downsizing and outsourcing in Dutch retail banking, this has 
resulted in a steady decline from a high of slightly over 50,000 workers in 2001 
to 47,000 workers in 2003 and, according to the latest figures, 40,000 on 
January 1, 2006 (CBS 2006a; O+S 2006). This is reflected in the decline of 
financial firms located in Amsterdam. Since 1998 when there were seventy-nine 
foreign financial firms in Amsterdam, their number has steadily declined to 
thirty-nine in 2004. Even more telling are the developments in the number of 
brokers located in Amsterdam. Of the twenty-six officially recognised brokers 
that were located in Amsterdam in 1975 only seven have survived. The rest 
have disappeared through mergers, takeovers, closures or relocations. Of the 
176 current members of Euronext who have a license to trade on the 
Amsterdam electronic order book only fifty-four are actually located in 
Amsterdam. This number encompasses the remaining Amsterdam brokers, 
foreign banks, as well as Dutch universal banks (NIBE-SVV 2005). Moreover, 
an increasing number of foreign financial firms are licensed by the Dutch 
Financial Market Authority to conduct business in the Netherlands without 
actually being located here. While their number reached forty-nine in 1993, it 
had increased to 371 in 2005 (DNB 2006). Because of remote access ports 
there is no longer a functional need to be located in the immediate surrounding 
of a physical exchange, while other potential advantages of co-location — 
specialised labor market, asymmetric information, the accessibility of social 
networks — have apparently also disappeared.  
What was a virtuous growth cycle in the 1990s — more liquid markets 
attracting more traders and investors, which, in turn attracted a growing number 
of firms tapping into Amsterdam’s financial markets — has rapidly turned into a 
vicious one of decreasing liquidity, a declining number of financial firms located 
in Amsterdam, and a decreasing number of share issuances. While part of the 
explanation is of course cyclical and has to do with the worldwide slump in stock 
prices after the bursting of the ICT bubble, in contrast to the LSE, the NYSE as 
well as Euronext at large, activity on the Amsterdam order book has remained 
lacklustre. Total monthly turnover on the Amsterdam exchange has decreased 
gradually from a high of EUR 153 billion in January 2001 to a low of EUR 33 
billion in February 2003, a steep decline even when taking into account that as 
of October 2001 the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics shifted from a double-
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counting measure of equity turnover to a single-counting one (CBS 2006b). As 
Table 2 indicates, such declines suggest that Amsterdam runs the danger of 
becoming one of the smaller European international financial centres. 
While these developments clearly concern Clark and O’Connor’s (1997) 
transparent category and might be explained by the centrifugal effects of larger 
pools of liquidity in neighbouring financial centres such as London, Paris, and 
Frankfurt, that is not the case with the postmillennial developments in the small 
and mid cap section of the Amsterdam stock exchange. Since we are dealing 
here with firms with total capitalisation between EUR 150 million and EUR 1 
billion in the case of midcaps and less than EUR 150 million in the case of 
smallcaps, we can safely assume that this is an investment category that falls 
largely outside the radar of mainstream equity analysts. As such, these financial 
products clearly belong to Clark and O’Connor’s opaque category, which, 
according to their reasoning, would continue to provide local intermediaries (i.e., 
Amsterdam-based brokers and analysts) competitive advantage over foreign 
financial service providers because of information asymmetries. However, 
between 2001 and 2005 no less than sixty-nine firms have left the Amsterdam 
exchange, thirteen because of bankruptcy and fifty-six because of mergers and 
delistings, a large number of them small and medium sized enterprises. Each 
year since 2001, including 2006, the Amsterdam exchange lost between 4 to 8 
percent of its listings (VEB 2006). Attempts to counter these losses by 
Euronext, such as the low-threshold Alternext order book, have yet failed to 
attract newcomers. While twenty-eight of the seventy-two new listings on the 
Paris Bourse since 2005 were on account of the Paris Alternext exchange, in 
Amsterdam the number of IPOs was only five. The success of the Paris 
Alternext appears to be largely due to fiscal subsidies and financial guarantees 
of the French Ministry of Finance for investors in SMEs quoted on the Alternext 
exchange. The Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs has already announced that 
no subsidies and guarantees will be forthcoming even though Alternext 
Amsterdam did receive a licence to operate from the Minister of Finance on 
May 30, 2006 (Het Financieele Dagblad 2006a). 
The category of translucent products was defined above as an 
intermediate product category, linked to highly sophisticated financial agents 
such as hedge funds, that has only recently become a main attractor for buyers 
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and sellers. What is striking about the Amsterdam case is the failure to develop 
a market in alternative investments, as it is called by the industry itself, and 
hence the absence of a vibrant community of smaller alternative financial firms. 
Approximately two-thirds (74 percent) of the 900 hedge funds active in Europe 
are located in London, which, moreover, controls more than 90 percent of all 
European capital invested in hedge funds (IFSL 2005), making London the 
hedge fund capital of Europe. Smaller clusters of hedge funds can be found in 
Paris and Madrid, while Zurich, Geneva, Stockholm, Luxembourg, and Dublin 
are in the ascendancy. According to the Dutch Financial Market Authority there 
are only five single-manager hedge funds authorised for distribution in the 
Netherlands. This is the same number as in 2002 (AFM 2005). However, hedge 
funds are only obliged to get authorisation if the fund has more than hundred 
participants and/or the participations are less than EUR 50,000. Hence, these 
figures fail to capture Amsterdam-located hedge funds like Aster-X, Theta 
Multistar, and Go-Capital, whose participatory thresholds are over EUR 50,000. 
Much larger is the number of funds of hedge funds in the Netherlands. The 
register of the Financial Market Authority lists thirty-five of these funds licenced 
to distribute in the Netherlands. However, roughly half of these are operating 
out of Luxembourg (AFM 2005: 29). While Amsterdam clearly is the capital of 
the Dutch hedge fund industry, its size is too small to generate the type of self-
sustaining innovation cycle that is visible in London (Financial Times 2006b). 
In short, in all three categories identified by Clark and O’Connor (1997), 
Amsterdam’s financial centre seems to have lost clout. In the category of 
transparent products, the trading agents increasingly seem to have exchanged 
their Amsterdam location for establishments in larger financial centres such as 
London, Paris, and Frankfurt. We contend that this is largely because access to 
transparent trading opportunities that used to be provided exclusively by the 
Amsterdam exchanges have increasingly, as a result of virtualisation and 
remote access ports, become accessible through other means. As such, this 
development is still within the boundaries of Clark and O’Connor’s framework, 
simply suggesting that the importance of the integration within a local trading 
community to gain interpretative trading advantages is diminishing or is itself 
shifting to a higher order trading community (i.e., the one based in London). 
Harder to accommodate, however, are the developments within the small and 
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midcap section of the Amsterdam exchange. These types of assets clearly fall 
within the opaque category and as such would represent the “sticky” type of 
trade that should remain the prerogative of the local (or national) trading 
communities despite increasing globalisation and the ensuing pull of larger 
financial centres. Nevertheless, in this product category too there are clear 
indications of decline. Finally the failure to develop a viable community of 
traders in translucent products suggests that there are interaction effects at 
work between the different product types and their respective trading 
communities, which can explain both success and failure in reproducing 
financial advantages. 
 
 
Accounting for Decline 
 
The questions raised by this case can be reconsidered in several ways. For 
example, at a generic level, has Amsterdam become less competitive in 
comparison to London and other European financial centres in terms of the 
presence/absence of knowledgeable workers and the availability of business 
infrastructures (e.g., Corporation of London 2005)? Alternatively, this argument 
could be complicated further by looking at both the changes in financial 
products (à la Clark and O’Connor 1997) and also the “relational” impacts on 
Amsterdam of changes in London and other financial centres in recent times 
(Beaverstock et al. 2005; Faulconbridge 2004). We argue that there is 
somewhat of a “chicken or egg” dilemma in terms of causality when examining 
changes in the levels of transparent and opaque products traded in Amsterdam. 
Three points are relevant in our view in relation to this argument. 
First, it seems that to understand the decline of Amsterdam it is vital to 
accommodate into the analyses changes over time in the knowledge intensity of 
different financial products and the degree of epistemic embeddedness of the 
groups of traders specialising in these products. In terms of opaque products, 
local players operating in Amsterdam seem to have lost their monopoly of local 
information gathering and with it the advantages associated with 
“embeddedness” in local epistemic communities. Despite a flurry of activities 
within the social studies of finance subdiscipline (see Arnoldi 2006; Beunza and 
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Garud 2005; Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1999), there is still a dearth of 
empirical studies on the activities of traders to state conclusively how they 
obtain their information and how they assess the inherent risks.  
Nevertheless, on the basis of the material available we can plausibly 
suggest that the “local” knowledge which used to be opaque to outsiders and 
which provided a monopolistic niche for local, intermediary agents is 
decreasingly so. Due to increases in computing powers, standardising agents 
like rating agencies (Moody’s; Standard & Poor’s; Fitch), transnational 
regulatory organisations (BIS; ECB; IOSCO), exchange organisations 
(Euronext; LSE; Deutsche Börse; Dow Jones Stoxx), financial information 
brokers (Bloomberg; Reuters; Thomson data) and private research institutes 
(Eurohedge; Institutional Investor; The Banker; Mar/Hedge) have increasingly 
been able to construct integrated, (quasi) transparent markets that dispense 
with local epistemic advantages. In fact, the added value of these agents and 
hence the source of their profits lies precisely in eroding informational 
asymmetries, whether caused by regulation, opaqueness, or time lags, in order 
to give investors a larger choice of investment opportunities.4  
Amsterdam’s decline would thus seem to be the result of a loss in 
competitive advantage and failure to replace it with anything new in the form of 
innovative opaque and translucent products that rely on locally-specific and 
embedded knowledge communities, as London and other centres have done. 
Moreover, while the departure of transparent trading might have been expected, 
it seems this may have been amplified (or caused?) by the gradual 
disappearance of “opaque” products from the centre’s exchanges. A case in 
point is the recent closure of the potato futures market in Amsterdam. 
Established in 1958 and located in the Amsterdam commodities exchange, it 
serviced Dutch, German, and Belgium farmers and provided them with an 
alternative outlet for their produce to the large wholesalers. Being integrated in 
Euronext.liffe and hence being managed out of London, the organisational 
support was insufficient to maintain a lively futures market in Amsterdam. While 
in 1998, 144,000 contracts were still being traded, in 2004 their number had 
declined to a mere 26,000. Since the costs of maintaining the market 
                                            
4 See Sinclair (2005) for precisely such an argument regarding the role of American 
rating agencies like Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s in the creation of worldwide bond 
markets. 
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outweighed the gains, Euronext.liffe has decided to close down the platform 
(Het Financieele Dagblad 2006b). While rational from an organisational 
perspective, the closure of markets like these is much less commendable for 
future innovation possibilities within the Amsterdam financial centre as such. 
For the Amsterdam case clearly shows that there are product, market, and 
trader complementarities, which are important for the innovative capabilities of 
IFC’s. Understanding this dynamic is vital and leads us to our second argument. 
The effect of the inability of Amsterdam’s financial community to 
reproduce “opaque” financial products needs exploring. The 1990s have seen 
an enormous increase in the importance of complex financial products, 
consisting of an assemblage of financial assets with different risk, return and 
liquidity profiles. These are demanded by highly sophisticated institutional 
investors and their intermediaries in order to reap returns over and above those 
provided by more mainstream (transparent) assets. At the most cutting edge of 
this type of financial trading are both the large international financial institutions 
and the “new” communities of “boutiques” and “hedge funds,” which 
increasingly mimic the organisational structure of the film and advertising 
industry and the “project ecologies” in which these are embedded (The 
Economist 2006; Grabher 2004; Hall 2006;). Both in these boutiques and in the 
larger financial institutions, the networks and expertise of individuals are used to 
maximise profit from complex financial transactions. Such an ecology requires 
both a circumscribed arena where these professionals can first learn the trade 
and subsequently built up a network of collaborators, meet other investors, and 
look for sophisticated customers. As the lack of a viable hedge fund community 
in Amsterdam indicates, these conditions were either absent or had been 
eroded too much to sustain the sort of epistemic exchange from which financial 
innovation springs forth. This raises two questions. First, is the absence of 
traders in translucent products primarily due to a decline in opaque products or, 
alternatively, in transparent products? In other words, is the future viability of 
smaller scale IFCs primarily dependent on the presence of agents that can 
mediate between outsiders and local opaque products (gatekeepers), or on the 
presence of traders who can transform transparent products into translucent, 
higher rewarding ones? 
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Third, it is important to examine the linkage between declines in liquidity, 
trade in transparent products and the financial innovation that leads to the 
development of translucent products. In light of the Amsterdam case it is 
evident that there are functional relations between the different categories, 
suggesting that loss of trade in one category spills over in the other and vice 
versa. For example, the rise of remote access may have allowed foreign 
financial institutions to leave Amsterdam, thus seriously weakening the 
epistemic “infrastructure” that is required for financial innovation. The difficulty 
with this line of argument, though, is that, as Clark, Wójcik, and Bauer (2006) 
note, there are intrinsic “home country” advantages even for transparent trade. 
Following this argument to its logical end, financial institutions would only want 
to leave a centre if these intrinsic “home country” advantages decline (which 
they do not yet seem to have done) or if some other factor affecting the 
profitability of their presence spurred the abandonment of a financial centre. A 
critical case in point is the consolidation under British law of the Shell Oil 
Corporation. Since July 2005 the shares of the British and Dutch branches of 
Shell have been transformed in dually listed RDS-A (formerly Royal Dutch Oil) 
and RDS-B shares. Based on liquidity arguments, the directors of Euronext 
Amsterdam feared that most trade would leak away. In view of the fact that 
Royal Dutch Oil trades accounted for 15 percent of average daily turnover, this 
would wreak havoc on Amsterdam’s liquidity. However, due to regulatory 
disadvantages of the LSE — a “stamp duty” of 0.5 percent raised on every 
share transaction — and sufficient initial liquidity in Amsterdam, over 70 percent 
of trade in RDS-A has remained in Amsterdam. As a result the spread in 
Amsterdam on RDS-A shares is four percentage points lower than in London, 
making Amsterdam still the most attractive location to conduct Shell trades. This 
was given a further boost in November 2005 when Dow Jones Stoxx 
announced that it would include the Amsterdam Shell price in its European 
index. However, it remains to be seen how durable this distribution of trade is 
going to be, since Shell itself also prefers the Amsterdam order book to 
effectuate its share buy back programs. In the future this could well result in a 
gradual decline of the number of “Dutch” shares vis-à-vis the British ones and 
hence in a loss of liquidity for the Amsterdam exchange and a rise in the spread 
between bid and offer prices. 
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Amsterdam’s relationality, both with the other members of the Euronext 
consortium and within a wider European financial system where London 
dominates as the leading centre, also means that only products with a high 
degree of “stickiness” – the most opaque products – will attract traders and 
compel their presence in the city. While “home country” advantages still exist for 
transparent trading, these do not seem to be big enough to override the 
compulsion of the leading financial institutions to centralise their activities in 
centres which are known for financial innovation. Neither do they impinge on the 
attractiveness of the largest centres where economies of scale can be gained – 
in Europe, in particular, London, where leading Amsterdam-based (but multiply 
listed) stocks such as ING, ABN Amro, Aegon, and Philips figure in the 
portfolios of major international institutions. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions: Interpreting the Influences on European 
Financial Geographies 
 
This paper has argued that there is much that remains to be done in order to 
fully understand the complex dynamics of European financial geographies and 
the changing roles of the multiple IFCs in Europe. In particular, by drawing on 
studies of the effects of the virtualisation of stock exchanges on financial 
geographies and the importance of epistemic “infrastructures” for financial 
activities, it has shown that the spatial distribution of activities within the new 
international financial system is, in many ways, inherently linked not only to both 
the characteristics and relative strengths and weaknesses of different financial 
centres but also to the relational networks that tie centres together and into 
wider global financial networks. 
In doing so, the analysis has in some ways echoed previous research 
focussing upon London’s changing role in European finance (Beaverstock et al. 
2005; Clark 2002; Faulconbridge 2004; Thrift 2000). All of these studies have 
noted the importance of London’s competitive urban infrastructure, regulation, 
and global interconnectivity and their effects upon the city’s sustenance as a 
leading IFC both within Europe and globally. They have also argued that 
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“product complementarities” and the prevalence of knowledge-intensive, “sticky” 
financial products in London are integral to the city’s continued growth. 
What this paper has offered to further this cause, however, is a deeper 
foray into the complex world of financial products and their complementarities, 
which emphasises the interdependencies between transparent, translucent, and 
opaque products and the way liquidity, innovation, and regulation are at the 
centre of these relationships. This has allowed us to identify the intricate 
linkages between different categories of financial products and the potential for 
feedback mechanisms that impact upon an IFCs long term sustenance and 
growth within global relational networks. The case of Amsterdam has revealed 
that the vibrancy of an IFC is determined by the skill and the number of its 
opaque and translucent traders, but that these, in turn, are crucially related to 
an underlying “infrastructure” that has been able to pool large “chunks” of 
capital – something that London possesses in abundance. 
In this regard, the upshot is that transparency, and hence liquidity, is not 
a given but is actively “produced,” as is demonstrated by the “construction” of 
an international real estate market through the commodification of so-called 
“mortgage-backed securities” (see Carruthers and Stinchcome 1999; Gotham 
2006). Far from falsifying the explanatory adequacy of the product-information-
based framework used in this paper, the “plasticity” of the categories, which, if 
our analysis is correct, is crucial for understanding the fate of different financial 
centres, can only be made visible on the basis of a typology of different ideal 
types such as the Clark and O’Connor (1997) one. In this we merely follow Max 
Weber’s prescriptions. Our categories should be understood as theoretical 
conceptualisations of a complex and layered social reality which allow us to 
focus on the discrepancies between the two — ideal type and empirical 
observations — in order to provide adequate explanations for these empirical 
“anomalies” (Swedberg 1998: 193-194; Weber 1972: 3). 
With regard to the reconfiguration of the stock exchange landscape and 
the emergence of the Euronext consortium, finally, there is a need to 
understand whether Amsterdam’s withering role in European finance can be 
explained by studying the complementarity of different types of financial 
products and the overlap between the different communities of traders only. 
Throughout the story we meet the effects of regulatory interventions, which 
 25
seem to have been determinant for the future course of developments within 
different IFCs. For example, the failure to back the development of a low 
threshold equity market by the Dutch Minister of Finance may well seal the fate 
of the Amsterdam exchange as a source of capital for growing Dutch firms. 
Furthermore, the early lifting of capital movement restrictions by the Dutch 
authorities may well have been to the advantage of large Dutch financial 
institutes, while gradually eroding the standing of the Amsterdam financial 
centre. Finally, the “battle of the bourses” that is currently reaching its endspiel 
may well result in a further loss of discretionary manoeuvring space for the 
directors of Euronext Amsterdam. It is, in any case, indicative that the Dutch 
authorities, in contrast to the German, the French, and the British, have until 
now remained silent over the distribution of employees, activities, and prestige 
over the different IFCs involved. Either intended or unintended, there is a case 
to be made for the suggestion that institutional changes are the ultimate causes 
underlying the current reconfiguration of the European financial landscape, 
while shifts in liquidity and kinds of trades are merely proximate ones. However, 
as stressed above, how these types of causes are related is still very much up 
for grabs. 
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Table 1.  The knowledge components and characteristics of different types of 
financial product. 
 
Category of 
financial 
product 
 
Characteristics of 
knowledge needed to 
trade in product 
 
 
Example 
 
Agents 
 
Reach of trade in product 
 
Transparent 
 
Products “whose qualities 
and dimensions (including 
relationships to other 
products) are so well 
known or simply and 
cheaply observed that 
institutions can trade 
in/out of positions just on 
the basis of observed past 
and current prices.” 
 
Gold; FX; blue 
chip stock and 
bonds 
 
Global 
financial 
institutes 
 
Global: being peripheral to 
the place of trading does not 
reduce the accuracy of 
trading as knowledge is 
explicit and codifiable, 
meaning embeddedness in 
the “epistemic community” 
associated with the product 
is unimportant. 
 
Translucent 
 
“Products [that] are 
variations on products 
whose standard properties 
are well known in the 
industry (at the global 
level), but whose specific 
qualities are only known in 
the local market.” 
 
 
Credit-based 
derivatives;  
asset backed 
securities; 
futures 
 
Hedge 
funds; 
specialised 
traders 
 
Intermediate: access to 
knowledge produced by 
epistemic community 
associated with this product 
is important but this 
knowledge only forms a 
small part of the 
understanding needed to 
trade in the product (the rest 
being codifiable).  Therefore, 
risk can often be judged 
using advice from a third 
party. 
 
Opaque 
 
“Products whose design 
and execution are 
premised upon the 
existence of 
asymmetrically distributed 
information.” 
 
Private equity; 
shares of 
small and 
midcap firms; 
commodities 
 
Local 
brokers 
 
National: direct access to 
tacit knowledge through 
presence within the 
epistemic community 
because of the low levels of 
standardised design and 
codified knowledge 
associated with the product. 
 
Source: Adapted from Clark and O’Connor (1997: 96-99). 
FX, foreign exchange. 
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Table 2. Indicators of Amsterdam’s significance as an international financial 
centre in Europe. 
 
 
Factor 
 
Amsterdam
 
Frankfurt 
 
London 
 
Paris 
 
 
Daily forex trade (EUR m)  
Source: BIS (2006). 35,816.94 74,018.28 526,444.1 44,257.27 
 
Daily Forex derivatives (EUR m)  
Source: BIS (2006). 33,038.9 66,063.7 478,580.2 41,840.8 
 
Loans value (EUR m)  
Source: BIS (2006). 371.6 1,152.3 2,494.5 774.6 
 
Equities traded daily (EUR m)  
Source: WFE (2006). 558,692.6 1,545,794 4,618,041 1,103,351 
 
No. HQ’s of firms from top 500  
Source: Fortune 500 (2006). 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
23 
 
 
27 
 
 
HQ, headquarter. 
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